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The Past and Future of
Constitutional Law and Social
Justice: Majestic or Substantive
Equality?
David Wiseman*

The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to
sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.
~ Anatole France, The Red Lily1

I. INTRODUCTION
Canadian society is characterized by significant and growing socioeconomic inequality that forms part of a broader landscape of persistent
social injustice. There are regular calls for governmental action to
address poverty and other social and economic disadvantages. The issue
I consider in this article is to what extent the Constitution of Canada,2
including the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,3 might play a role, over
the longer term, in alleviating socio-economic inequality. Put more
briefly, what are the prospects for advancing social justice through
constitutional law over the long term?
*
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law (Common Law Section (English)), University of
Ottawa. I wish to thank the organizers, Professors Sonia Lawrence and Benjamin Berger, of the 18th
Annual Constitutional Cases Conference (April, 2015), at which an earlier version of this article was
presented. I also wish to thank Bruce Porter, Martha Jackman and the anonymous reviewer for valuable
comments on earlier versions. Finally, thanks to Brad Yaeger for excellent research assistance, funded
in part via the Law Foundation of Ontario Fellowships program.
1
First published in 1894. As quoted in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v.
Saskatchewan, [2015] S.C.J. No. 4, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 245, 2015 SCC 4, per Abella J., at para. 56
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Saskatchewan”].
2
Constitution Act, 1982, enacted by the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), c.11, s. 1, reprinted in R.S.C.
1985, Appendix II, No. 5 [hereinafter “Constitution”].
3
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
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For the purposes of this article, the ideal of “social justice” is thus
understood as primarily concerned with the eradication of socio-economic
inequality. To be clear, in the present context, a distinction is drawn
between socio-economic difference and socio-economic inequality, with
the distinction being that the former is a descriptive label, whereas the
latter is a normative concept involving notions of unjustifiable disadvantage
and discrimination. Consequently, not all circumstances of socio-economic
difference will necessarily amount to socio-economic inequality and,
indeed, some circumstances of socio-economic sameness may not ensure
socio-economic equality.4 Further, this article also distinguishes between
a substantive conception of socio-economic equality and a merely formal
or, in the words of Anatole France, “majestic” conception of socioeconomic equality. In fact, since it can be argued that it is the very
concern for the socio-economic dimension of equality, as opposed to the
more traditional civil and political dimensions, that distinguishes substantive
equality from formal/majestic equality, there is a degree of redundancy
to the use of the “socio-economic” qualifier when distinguishing these
conceptions of equality. Therefore, in the context of this article, the key
distinction between these conceptions of equality is that the formal
version  which is often defined as “treat likes alike”  focuses on a
need to address differential treatment in law, whereas the substantive
version acknowledges a need to address differential social and economic
circumstances in society. Of course, differential treatment in law can
often create, reinforce or exacerbate differential social and economic
circumstances, and so substantive equality can overlap with or
incorporate the demands of formal equality. However, substantive
equality transcends formal equality at the point where it demands differential
legal treatment in order to ameliorate and overcome inequalities in social
and economic circumstances.5 France’s ironic aphorism masterfully captures
these contrasting conceptions by juxtaposing the social circumstances and
4
For discussion of the notions of social justice, socio-economic inequality and substantive
equality, and the relationships between them, in the context of constitutional law under the Charter,
see Bruce Porter, “Expectations of Equality” (2006) 33 S.C.L.R. (2d) 23 [hereinafter “Porter”]; and
Margot Young, “Social Justice and the Charter: Comparison and Choice” (2013) 50 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 669 [hereinafter “Young, ‘Social Justice’”] and “Unequal to the Task: Kapp’ing the Substantive
Potential of Section 15” [hereinafter “Young, ‘Kapp’ing’”] in Sanda Rodgers & Sheila McIntyre,
eds., The Supreme Court of Canada and Social Justice: Commitment, Retrenchment or Retreat
(Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2010).
5
By the same token, it should be noted that some versions of formal equality  those
that meaningfully acknowledge the need to not only treat likes alike but also to “treat un-alikes
un-alikely”  can potentially incorporate some of the demands for substantive equality.
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legal treatment of the rich and poor. The law’s identical treatment,
prohibiting both from sleeping rough, pan-handling or stealing, accords
with formal equality. Yet it ignores the fact that only the poor may be
driven by their disadvantaged social and economic circumstances to
pursue such desperate survival measures. The result is a hollow equality
 it has a formal majesty, but it is not meaningful to the lived reality of
poverty. Substantive equality notices this contrast and asks for a legal
response that addresses social and economic disadvantage in order to
protect people against the need to act so desperately. Writ larger, the
demands of substantive equality can be regarded as the social justice
aspiration of social democracies like Canada. In turn, the question of
what the prospects are for advancing social justice through constitutional
law over the long term can be understood as the question of to what
extent constitutional law promotes socio-economic equality or, in other
words, substantive equality. Given the close association being posited
between these three terms (i.e., social justice, socio-economic equality
and substantive equality), they will be used somewhat interchangeably.
Lacking a crystal ball, I initially take a “back-to-the-future” approach
to that question by reviewing the role of constitutional law over the past
three decades or so. My review indicates that at particular moments, and in
particular ways, constitutional law can be either positively or negatively
involved in the action and inaction of governments in relation to socioeconomic inequality and social injustice. This review supports the first part
of my argument in this article, which is that, cumulatively, and over the
longer term, the role of constitutional law has been predominantly one of
facilitating substantive equality. By describing its role as facilitative
I mean that constitutional law has not generally blocked governmental
action addressing social injustice and, instead, has generally tended to
enable or validate it. So, generally speaking, when governments have chosen
to use legal measures to improve substantive equality, constitutional law has
generally facilitated that choice by upholding the constitutionality of those
legal measures. However, at the same time, constitutional law has been
decidedly reluctant to compel governments to alleviate socio-economic
inequality or to otherwise protect or advance social justice, and it has often
refused to stop governments from exacerbating inequality and injustice.
Although there are some bright spots, especially under the Charter, where
constitutional law has forced or protected some substantive equality
measures, judicial support for substantive equality has generally been
restrained and cautious. In my view, looking ahead, and especially given
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current socio-economic trends, while facilitative constitutional law is
good, it is not good enough. This leads me to the second part of my
argument, which is that, for constitutional law to play a more meaningful
role in advancing substantive equality and social justice in the decades
ahead, a key element of constitutional law under the Charter will need to
change. Specifically, I argue that the judicial approach to concerns over the
social policy complexity of substantive equality claims under the Charter
is in danger of trapping those claims between a rock and a hard place and,
in so doing, denying constitutional law the potential to move beyond
merely facilitating social justice to a more meaningful role of protecting
and compelling it. What is needed, I argue, is a new approach to
acknowledging and managing the social policy complexity of substantive
equality claims.
This article has three parts. In Part II, I provide a brief overview of some
indicators of socio-economic inequality in Canada. In Part III, I review the
past three decades or so of constitutional law in relation to government
action and inaction on social justice and substantive equality. This review
includes, but is not limited to, the role of the Charter. In Part IV, I identify
and consider the problem of social policy complexity, and responses to it, as
an element of constitutional law under the Charter that will need to be
addressed if constitutional law is to play a more meaningful role in
protecting and advancing substantive equality in the coming decades.

II.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN CANADA

For many decades Canadian governments have pursued social welfare
policies that have provided a significant degree of both universal and
targeted socio-economic support, and that have therefore played an
important role in addressing substantive inequality.6 Yet, as will be
discussed in this part, Canadian society is still marked by persistently
significant levels of poverty and by increasing levels of socio-economic
inequality. The detrimental impact of significant poverty on individuals
and groups has been known and documented for some time. Individuals and
groups who experience poverty also disproportionately experience adverse
socio-economic circumstances and outcomes. In other words, it is well
6

For example, social assistance and unemployment insurance programs. For an historical
overview of the establishment and development of these and other governmental initiatives, see
Dennis Guest, The Emergence of Social Security in Canada, 3d ed. (Vancouver: University of
British Columbia Press, 1997).
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recognized that absolute levels of income deprivation translate into unequal
adverse socio-economic outcomes. More recently though, attention is being
paid to how relative levels of income inequality generate their own distinct
detriments, both to those individuals and groups who are relatively deprived
and to the broader societies within which they live.7 Income inequality is now
understood to compound the detriment caused by income deprivation. In
what follows in this part I provide a brief overview of the situations of both
poverty and income inequality in Canada, while also noting the ongoing
capacity of Canadian governments to influence these situations through their
policy choices. I conclude this section with a brief observation on the
significance of this for a constitutional conception of substantive equality.
In terms of poverty, a Statistics Canada research paper on low-income
incidence produced in 2012 reported a Canadian low-income rate of 13 per
cent in 1976 and 11.7 per cent in 2009,8 with an average incidence of 12.6
per cent over the period. This is despite the fact that, over the same basic
period (1975 to 2013), Canada’s gross domestic product (“GDP”) grew by
almost 1,000 per cent, from $173.5 billion to $1.8 trillion.9 There is no
question that social welfare or, as they are referred to by the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”), “social
protection” policies, play a significant role in ensuring that the incidence of
low-income in Canada is not worse. In 2013, social protection expenditure
across the nine categories monitored by the OECD totalled 17.4 per cent of
Canada’s GDP.10 Through these types of expenditures, and other
redistributive measures, the Gini coefficient measure of income inequality
in Canada in 2011 for the aggregate of family units was reduced from
0.436 to 0.313.11 Moreover, governments have had success with policy
7
A widely-known recent argument of this nature is provided in R. Wilkinson & K. Pickett,
The Spirit Level (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2010) [hereinafter “Wilkinson & Pickett”].
8
Brian Murphy, Xuelin Zhang & Claude Dionne, Low Income in Canada: a Multi-line
and Multi-index Perspective (2012), online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75f0002m/ 75f0002m2012001eng.pdf> [hereinafter “StatsCan”]. These figures are the annual average of the three measures of
low-income maintained by Statistics Canada: the Low Income Measure (which calculates the
proportion of the population whose income is 50 per cent or less of the median adjusted national
income); the Low-Income Cut-Off (which calculates the threshold income below which a family is
likely to devote a larger share of its income to the necessities of food, shelter and clothing than the
average family); and the Market Basket Measure (which calculates the threshold income needed to
purchase a specific basket of goods representing basic living standards).
9
The World Bank, “GDP (Current US$)”, online: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries/CA?display=graph>.
10
OECD Databank, online: <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SOCX_AGG>.
11
The Gini coefficient is a measure for income inequality. The Gini is zero if everyone has
the same income and is one if a single person has all the income. Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table
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choices that have prioritized reducing poverty among particular groups.
For example, reducing poverty among older adults has been a particular
priority and concerted policy attention has produced a long-term decrease
in incidence of low-income among this group  from 21 per cent in 1981
to just over 5 per cent in 2010.12 On the other hand, groups who have not
been prioritized, such as recent immigrants, off-reserve Aboriginal people,
persons living with disabilities, and unattached individuals under 65, have
seen their incidence of low income barely improve or, for the last of these
groups, become somewhat worse, over this period. The relationship
between governmental policy choices and low-income incidence is attested
to in Figure 1, below, which charts five categories of Canadian social
protection expenditure, as a proportion of GDP, from 1980 to 2013. As can
be seen, expenditure in the “old age” category has risen over one
percentage point over the period, whereas expenditure in the “social
assistance” category has barely risen over half a percentage point, and
expenditure in the “unemployment” and “housing” categories has fallen.

Figure 1: Figure produced with data obtained from OECD Library,
“Social Expenditure - Aggregated Data”, obtained May 2015, online:
<https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SOCX_AGG#>.
The effects of persistent poverty and income deprivation are well
known. A review of Canadian literature relevant to the issue of the social
202-0709, online: <http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&retrLang=eng&id=2020709&
pattern=202-0701..202-0709&tabMode=dataTable&srchLan=-1&p1=-1&p2=31>.
12
Citizens for Public Justice, Poverty Trends Scorecard (2012), at 6, online:
<http://www.cpj.ca/files/docs/poverty-trends-scorecard.pdf>.
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consequences of economic inequality for Canadian children concluded that
there is a “strong relationship between low income and/or socio-economic
status and deleterious social outcomes”.13 The social outcomes where
detriment was evident included: likelihood of physical, sexual and emotional
victimization; incidence of lower academic/cognitive educational
achievement and undesirable social/behavioural activity; lower life
expectancy, risk of illness and other emotional and physical health
experiences; and employment outcomes. Moreover, given the overrepresentation of women, new immigrants, racialized populations and
people living with disabilities among the lower income strata, these
detrimental social outcomes are disproportionately borne by these groups.14
In Part IV of this article, I will be referring to a Charter claim that
Canadian governments have failed to protect people against homelessness
and inadequate housing. Specific statistics in this area are alarming. For
example, it is estimated that approximately 35,000 people are homeless on
any given night and that over 235,000 people experience homelessness in a
year.15 It is also estimated that nearly one in five renter households
experience extreme housing affordability problems, defined as being on
low income and spending more than 50 per cent of income on rent.16 Less
extreme affordability problems, defined by Canada Mortgage and Housing
Corporation as spending more than 30 per cent of income on rent or
similar housing costs (i.e., a mortgage), affect nearly half of all renter
households and nearly 20 per cent of owner households. The situations of
both homelessness and precarious housing have known detrimental
impacts on individual’s physical and mental health, as well as other social
outcomes, and this has been recognized by Canadian courts.17 Households
that have to spend a high proportion of income on rent often do not have
sufficient funds for other basic necessities, such as food. Food bank use has
13
Canadian Council on Learning, The Social Consequences of Economic Inequality for Canadian
Children: A Review of the Canadian Literature (2006), online: <www.edu.gov.on.ca/eng/research/
social_consequences2.pdf>.
14
See StatsCan, supra, note 8 generally. See also Meyer Burstein, “Combatting the Social
Exclusion of At-Risk Groups”, Policy Research Initiative (2005), at 7, online: <http://dspace.
africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/23099/1/Combatting%20the%20Social%20Exclusion%20of%20
At%20Risk%20Groups.pdf?1>.
15
Stephen Gaetz, Tanya Gulliver & Tim Richter, The State of Homelessness in Canada
2014 (Toronto: The Homeless Hub Press, 2014), at 5.
16
Id.
17
See Victoria (City) v. Adams, [2009] B.C.J. No. 1538, 95 B.C.L.R. (4th) 175, 2009 BCSC
1043, at para. 18 (B.C.S.C.), affd [2009] B.C.J. No. 2451, 100 B.C.L.R. (4th) 28, 2009 BCCA 563
(B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Adams”].
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climbed steadily and significantly in Canada over the past two decades, with
2012 seeing a record number of 872,379 people using a food bank during
the annual counting month of March.18 The number decreased to 833,098
for 2013, but then climbed to 841,191 for 2014.19 The March 2014 count
represents an increase in usage of 25 per cent over March 2008, which was
the last year of a periodic downward trend in food bank use that ended with
the 2008-09 global recession.20
The disproportionate detrimental circumstances and outcomes
produced by absolute levels of poverty and low-income, such as precarious
housing and food insecurity, are then compounded by the detrimental
impact of relative income inequality. Although social protection
expenditure and other redistributive measures perform a significant
ameliorative function on the degree of income inequality in Canada,
Canadian society is now materially more income-unequal than it was in
the mid-1970s. As shown in Figure 2, below, after declining steadily, if
erratically, between 1975 and 1989, Canada’s Gini coefficient rose steadily
until around 2005, and has since remained at a similar level. Over the same
period, Canada’s gross national income per capita has risen steadily.

Figure 2: Figure prepared using data obtained from Statistics Canada,
CANSIM Table 202-0705, “Gini coefficients of market, total and after-tax
income, by economic family type” obtained May 2015; and from United
Nations Statistics Division, “Per Capita GNI at Current U.S. Prices”
obtained May 2015.
The way in which income inequality in Canada has increased is
probably not surprising. The share of total income for the richest 20 per cent
18
19
20

Food Banks Canada, Hunger Count 2012 (Toronto: Food Banks Canada, 2012).
Food Banks Canada, Hunger Count 2014 (Toronto: Food Banks Canada, 2014).
Id.
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of the population has been steadily increasing since the early 1980s  from
43 per cent to 47.3 per cent. This has come at the expense of both the middle
40 per cent of income earners and the lower 40 per cent group, whose shares
have fallen by around 2 per cent each.21
The apparent lack of relationship between economic growth and
more equal income distribution, as well as the persistence and impact of
income inequality itself, have become subjects of investigation in recent
economic literature. For instance, in The Spirit Level, a study that quickly
drew attention, one conclusion reached by authors Wilkinson and Pickett
is that as GDP per capita reaches the relatively affluent range of $30,000
(which it did in Canada in 2004), improvements in societal well-being
become more closely related to income distribution than economic
growth.22 Wilkinson and Pickett also found a very close and direct
correlation between increased incidence of a variety of social problems 
including loss of social trust and collaborative relations  and the high
levels of income inequality in developed countries.23 Similarly, the
Canadian Index of Wellbeing (“CIW”) reported that although Canadian
GDP grew by 28.9 per cent from 1994 to 2010, a measure of the (objective)
well-being of Canadians grew by only 5.7 per cent in the same period.24 The
authors partly attributed the slower increase in well-being to increasing
socio-economic inequality over the period. In addition, the CIW reported
that, during the recession of 2008 to 2010, while GDP declined 8.3 per
cent, well-being declined 24 per cent.25 More broadly, research by the
International Monetary Fund has concluded that economic growth is
21
Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 202-0405, “Upper income limits and income shares of
total income quintiles, by economic family type, 2011 constant dollars”, online:
<http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&id=2020405>.
22
Wilkinson & Pickett, supra, note 7, at 8.
23
Id., at 6.
24
Canadian Index of Wellbeing, How are Canadians Really Doing? (Waterloo, Ont.:
CIW and University of Waterloo, 2012), at 1, online: <https://uwaterloo.ca/canadian-indexwellbeing/sites/ca.canadian-index-wellbeing/files/uploads/files/CIW2012-HowAreCanadiansReallyDoing23Oct2012_0.pdf>. The results of the CIW are echoed in the results of a global study of subjective
happiness, see John Helliwell, Richard Layard & Jeffrey Sacks eds., World Happiness Report 2013
(New York: UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, 2013). In the WHR, Canada ranked 6th in
the world and was topped only by Switzerland (3rd) and a collection of Northern European countries
(Denmark (1st), Norway (2nd), Netherlands (4th), Sweden (5th)). Nevertheless, the WHR also recognizes
that happiness inequality exists in Canada. In fact, the WHR finds that over the five years since the
previous report, although overall happiness is at a similar level in Canada, inequality of happiness has
increased. The increase in inequality of happiness echoes increases in socio-economic inequality over the
same period and, indeed, further back.
25
Id., at 10.
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generally more sustainable when income distributions are more
equalized.26
The idea that income inequality is a problem in its own right puts the
task of defining a constitutional conception of equality in a new light. To
the extent that constitutional law seeks to protect and advance
substantive equality in the socio-economic realm, this idea means that
constitutional law needs to be concerned not only with the relationship
between inequality of socio-economic conditions and income deprivation
but also with the relationship between adverse socio-economic
conditions and income inequality. Constitutional law needs to pay
attention to the policy choices of Canadian governments in relation to
both the floor of socio-economic well-being and the distance between the
floor and the ceiling of socio-economic well-being. In considering the
role of constitutional law in relation to socio-economic inequality, it also
bears re-emphasizing that, although the degree of socio-economic
inequality in Canada is clearly influenced by regional and international
economics and other events, and although the causes and impacts of
those events are to a significant extent beyond the control of domestic
governments, the policy choices of Canadian governments nevertheless
remain relevant. This is evident in a negative way in the fact that the
general worsening of income inequality in Canada since the mid-1990s
corresponds with a significant retrenchment in Canadian social programs
brought about through the erosion and eventual elimination of the
Canada Assistance Plan.27 But it is also evident in a positive way, as
evident in the relative success of the deliberate and concerted policy
action taken on poverty among older adults. More recently, the final
report on a large scale trial of so-called Housing First strategies across
five Canadian locations has shown significant improvement in the life
circumstances of the homeless persons who participated, along with
significant cost savings to society, as compared to “treatment-as-usual”.28
The persistence of income deprivation and income inequality in Canada
is thus in part attributable to the choices that Canadian governments
make as to what policy actions and interventions they will undertake.
26
Andrew G. Berg & Jonathan D. Ostry, “Inequality and Unsustainable Growth: Two Sides of
the Same Coin?”, IMF Research Department (2011), at 3, online: <https://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn1108.pdf>. See also, Broadbent Institute, Towards a More Equal Canada: A Report
on Canada’s Economic and Social Inequality (Ottawa: Broadbent Institute, 2012), online:
<http://www.broadbentinstitute.ca/towards_a_more_equal_canada>.
27
See discussion below, Part III.1.
28
Paula Goering et al., National At Home/Chez Soi Final Report (Calgary: Mental Health
Commission of Canada, 2014), online: <http://www.mentalhealthcommission.ca/English/node/24376>.
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Since constitutional law plays a fundamental role in regulating those
choices, it also has the potential to play a role in the prevalence of socioeconomic inequality in Canada. In the next part I move to an overview of
the role that constitutional law has played over the past few decades.

III. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: LOOKING BACK
The Canadian Constitution and Charter of Rights and Freedoms are
the foundational infrastructure for the exercise of public legal authority.
The constitutional law that emanates from them covers a range of
fundamental aspects of democratic governance. The areas of
constitutional law that have had greatest relevance to social justice are:
the identification and division of powers between different levels of
government (under sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution); the definition
and jurisdictions of the different branches of government, including the
separation of powers (under Parts III, IV and VII of the Constitution);
and, the enumeration (and implication) of the fundamental principles,
rights and freedoms that all branches and levels of government must
respect, including Aboriginal rights (under section 35 of the
Constitution) and those guaranteed by the Charter. I will address the
relationship between constitutional law and social justice in each of these
areas.
1. Division of Powers
The division of powers in Canada has played a facilitative role in
relation to governmental action on substantive equality and social justice.
At a general level, the constitutional provisions that identify and allocate
governmental powers between the federal and provincial layers of
government include ample power to regulate socio-economic activity and
to implement programs to address substantive inequality. The language
of the constitutional division of powers reserves some areas of socioeconomic policy to one layer of government or the other and so, at times,
a federal or provincial government may find itself somewhat restricted in
those areas, but it is never the case that neither layer of government can
act.29 Moreover, constitutional law has rejected the idea that the division
29
Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2005), at
part 15.9(e) [hereinafter “Hogg”].
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of powers creates “watertight compartments”30 and so, due to the multidimensional nature of many social justice issues, it is often the case that
both the federal and provincial governments can act in the same areas,
even though they may technically need to be targeting different
dimensions of the same area, in accordance with the differences between
their available heads of power. For instance, while health care is
regarded as an area of provincial jurisdiction, the federal government’s
power over criminal law enables it to actively regulate many activities 
such as abortion services31 or drug addiction treatment32  that have
both health and criminal/moral dimensions and that also implicate issues
of socio-economic inequality. At the same time though, constitutional
law includes doctrines relating to federal paramountcy and
interjurisdictional immunity that can sometimes thwart the plans of one
or other layer of government when seeking to act in an area of mutual
attraction.33
At a more specific level, constitutional law has played a particularly
facilitative role through sanctioning conditional and unconditional
federal spending in areas that ostensibly lie outside the scope of powers
granted to the federal government. Although the Constitution contains no
explicit “spending power”, it is taken as a matter of implied
constitutional necessity that the federal government has the authority to
spend the money it legitimately raises from taxes and other sources.34
30
Canada (Attorney General) v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1937] A.C. 326, [1937] 1
D.L.R. 673 (P.C.).
31
R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at para. 191 (S.C.C.).
32
Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44,
[2011] 3 S.C.R. 134, at para. 52 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “PHS”].
33
For instance, the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity has meant that federal
jurisdiction over the so-called federally-regulated undertakings identified in s. 92(10)(a) of the
Constitution has led to provincial minimum wage provisions being rendered inapplicable to
companies operating in those industries because such provisions intrude on a “vital part” of the
management and operation of such undertakings: see, Quebec (Commission du Salaire Minimum) v.
Bell Telephone Co. of Canada, [1966] S.C.J. No. 51, [1966] S.C.R. 767 (S.C.C.). Nevertheless, the
federal government has the legislative power to set minimum wages of employees of those
companies (as it did subsequently to the Commission du Salaire Minimum case). For provincial
intrusions that affected less “vital parts” of federally-regulated undertakings, the doctrine of
paramountcy of federal legislation would mean that inconsistent federal regulation would also render
the provincial intrusions inapplicable.
34
Hogg contends that a basic spending power “must be inferred from the powers to levy
taxes (s. 91(3)), to legislate in relation to ‘public property’ (s. 91(1A)), and to appropriate federal
funds (s. 106)”. See Hogg, supra, note 29, at part 6.8(a). Doctrinally, the first judicial confirmation
of the existence of the spending power has been attributed to Lord Atkin in Canada (Attorney
General) v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1937] J.C.J. No. 6, [1937] A.C. 355, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 684,
at 5 (P.C.). Lord Atkin appeared to set limits to the scope of the power that now seem to have been
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The more contentious issue is whether this power should be regarded as
limited to the subject-matters of law-making assigned to the federal
government under the division of powers.35 This issue potentially
impacts a wide array of cost-sharing and cost-contribution agreements
between the federal and provincial governments in areas that directly
implicate socio-economic equality and social justice. The prime example
is federal spending on provincial social assistance programs. The
provision of social assistance is generally regarded as a matter of
provincial jurisdiction.36 When initiated in the form of the Canada
Assistance Plan Act (the “CAP”),37 in 1966, federal government spending
in this area occurred through an agreement to an uncapped 50/50 costsharing arrangement that included conditions on various aspects of the
programs for which cost-sharing was offered. The conditions included,
for example, that the level of benefits provided under social assistance
programs take account of the costs of basic necessities.38 Almost three
decades later, the Supreme Court had to decide Re Canada Assistance
Plan,39 a constitutional challenge (by way of a reference launched by the
government of British Columbia) to unilateral federal changes to the
terms of the CAP that limited annual growth in the federal contribution
to five per cent for “have” provinces (Ontario, Alberta and British
rejected, see Reference re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 60, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525
(S.C.C.), and discussion in remainder of this section. Although perhaps still legally debatable, the
practical and political validity of the federal spending power is affirmed by, for instance, its specific
mention in the Canadian Agreement - A Framework to Improve the Social Union for Canadians,
online: <http://www.scics.gc.ca/english/conferences.asp?a=viewdocument&id=638>.
35
For an argument as to why a spending power should be at least somewhat limited, see
Andrew Petter, “Federalism and the Myth of the Federal Spending Power” (1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev.
448. For analysis of the broader issue of federal jurisdiction over social policy, see Sujit Choudhry,
“Recasting Social Canada: A Reconsideration of Federal Jurisdiction over Social Policy” (2002)
52:3 University of Toronto L.J. 163-252.
36
Keith G. Banting, The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism (Kingston & Montreal:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1982), at 48.
37
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-1 [rep.]. For an overview of the Canada Assistance Plan Act and the
nature of the agreements entered into under it (as well as the Social Union Framework Agreement
that superseded it) see Barbara Cameron, “Accounting for Rights and Money in the Canadian Social
Union” [hereinafter “Cameron”] in Margot Young, Susan B. Boyd, Gwen Brodsky & Shelagh Day
(eds.), Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship, Legal Activism (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 2007), ch. 8 [hereinafter “Young, ‘Poverty’”].
38
See Canada Assistance Plan Act, id., at s. 6(2)(a). See also Finlay v. Canada (Minister of
Finance), [1986] S.C.J. No. 73, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.), where the citizen-enforceability of this
aspect of the agreement was considered.
39
Reference re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 60, [1991] 2 S.C.R.
525(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Re Canada Assistance Plan”].
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Columbia), thus eroding the 50/50 split. The main focus of the challenge
was an objection to the unilateral nature of the federal government’s
actions. The government of British Columbia, joined by other provinces,
argued that no amendments to the CAP could occur without provincial
consent. In the course of the reference, the province of Manitoba raised
an argument that appeared to dispute the power of the federal
government to intrude into provincial jurisdiction via conditional grants
under the spending power. This argument was directly rejected by
Sopinka J. for the unanimous Court.40
The judicial validation of a federal spending power that can be used
in areas of provincial legislative jurisdiction is an example of the more
specific facilitative role of constitutional law in relation to socioeconomic inequality. The social assistance programs funded via the CAP
can be regarded as governmental actions that promote or improve
substantive equality. Fundamentally, social assistance programs
acknowledge differential socio-economic circumstances and, in
particular, social and economic disadvantage and injustice. Through the
creation of programs providing benefits targeted to needs, social
assistance programs involve differential legal treatment (not everyone
meets the legal criteria for receiving assistance) aimed at ameliorating
differential social circumstances. In addition, in the subsequent case of
Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance), the Supreme Court held that
individual Canadians were entitled to bring a court action to enforce the
CAP condition of setting benefits at a level that takes into account basic
necessities. In this way, constitutional law facilitates a means of citizen
accountability for the terms of inter-governmental cost-contribution
agreements that relate to substantive equality.
At the same time though, in Re Canada Assistance Plan, the Court
validated the federal government’s liberty to unilaterally alter the terms
of the agreement, in part based on the fundamental constitutional
principle of parliamentary sovereignty that limits the power of a present
Parliament to bind a future Parliament. By validating this governmental
liberty in circumstances that involved an erosion of an agreement that
supported substantive equality, the Court restrained the ability of
constitutional law to go beyond facilitating to protecting substantive
equality. In a few short years, the federal government eliminated the
CAP altogether, replacing it with new agreements that significantly
40
Id., at 567. By the same token, the Court has recognized a similar scope for provincial
spending power, see Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] S.C.J. No. 36, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 (S.C.C.).
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reduced the federal share of social program expenditures.41 The price of
provincial acceptance of these agreements was a loosening or
abandonment of the federal conditions, including the “basic necessities”
reference point, that, in turn, enabled some provinces to pursue drastic
cutbacks in levels of social assistance. In Ontario, for example, the Harris
government reduced social assistance rates by 22.6 per cent.42 This cut
had devastating consequences for individuals in receipt of social
assistance and significantly increased socio-economic inequality.43 The
unwillingness of the courts to allow the Charter-based area of
constitutional law to be used to protect the socio-economically
disadvantaged from these consequences will be considered below.44
Along the way, with the move to largely unconditional transfers, Finlay’s
hard won entitlement to hold governments accountable to the terms of
their cost-sharing arrangements became meaningless.
2. Separation of Powers
The facilitative role of constitutional law in relation to social justice
is also evident in the area of the separation of powers between the
constitutionally defined branches of government  legislature,
executive/administration and judiciary. Concerns about maintaining an
appropriate separation of powers arise in two main contexts: first, in the
context of governmental initiatives aimed at deploying the apparatus of
the administrative state to improve access to justice in key areas of social
justice and socio-economic inequality; and, second, in the context of
Charter-based judicial scrutiny of governmental action in relation to
socio-economic inequality. In this section I will focus on the first
context, leaving the second context to section 4, below. In addition, in
this section, I will discuss the recent confirmation that constitutional law
on the separation of powers can play a protective role in relation to
substantive equality in the sense that the constitutional establishment of
the judicial branch has been held to necessitate a measure of protection
for access to justice.
41

For a discussion of the dismantling of CAP and transition to new arrangements, see
Cameron, supra, note 37 and Lorne Sossin, “Salvaging the Welfare State: The Prospects for Judicial
Review of the Canada Health & Social Transfer” (1998) 21 Dalhousie L.J. 141.
42
Ian Morrison, “Ontario Works: A Preliminary Assessment” (1998) 13 J. L. Soc. Pol’y 1, at 5.
43
Id.
44
See section III.4, below.
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After a rocky start, the facilitative role of constitutional law in the
context of administrative state deployment in social justice areas now
seems well entrenched. The key constitutional issue has been to prevent
the improper transfer of power from the judicial branch of government,
which is established by section 96 of the Constitution Act 1867, to the
executive/administrative branch in general and to administrative
tribunals more specifically. This issue has arisen in relation to the
establishment and operation of a variety of administrative tribunals in a
number of different social policy areas of special significance for social
justice and socio-economic inequality. This includes residential tenancy
disputes and cases in that area have established some of the basics of
constitutional law on the issue. In the area of residential tenancies, which
is generally representative of the aims and methods of administrative
state deployment,45 all provinces have for some time had legislation that
regulates residential tenancy relationships.46 In general, this legislation
affects both the substantive terms of residential leases and the process by
which disputes are resolved. Substantively, the legislation revises or
replaces relevant common law principles and doctrines, emanating from
property and contract law. The objective of doing so has been, at least in
part, to ameliorate the substantive inequality that can exist between
landlords and tenants, some of which is bolstered by traditional common
law rules.47 Procedurally, the legislation substitutes an administrative
decision-maker and/or tribunal for the regular courts, with the objective
being to provide a more “informal, effective, expeditious and
inexpensive”48 process that improves access to justice. This multipronged objective is achieved, at least in part, by means of establishing a
dispute resolution process that is more expert in residential tenancy
issues and less constrained by traditional common law approaches (or
ideologies). Typically, the regular courts retain a degree of jurisdiction
that enables them to undertake some supervision of the decisions of the
tribunals, but the role of the courts is significantly reduced. In other
words, both substantively and procedurally, the powers of the judicial
45
For an overview of the aims and methods of the administrative state, especially in relation to
displacement of courts and the common law, see W.A. Bogart, Courts and Country: The Limits of
Litigation and the Social and Political Life of Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1994).
46
Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17; Residential Tenancy Act, S.B.C. 2002,
c. 78; Civil Code of Québec, CCQ-1991.
47
For an overview of the genesis and substance of residential tenancy law reform, see B.
Ziff, Principles of Property Law, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2000), at 276-82.
48
Id., at 277.
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branch of government are being significantly re-allocated to an organ of
the executive/administrative branch.
The judicial consideration of the issue of whether this particular reallocation of powers violated the constitutional separation of powers got
off to a rocky start with the Supreme Court’s decision in Reference re:
Residential Tenancies Act 1979 (Ontario).49 The case arose as a reference
by the provincial government as a preliminary step to the introduction of a
new residential tenancy regime in Ontario. With its decision, the Supreme
Court both initiated a constitutional test for re-allocations of power from
courts to administrative tribunals and found that the regime planned in
Ontario would violate that test. The Court laid down a three-part test for
constitutionality that required examination of: whether the re-allocated
powers had historically been exclusively exercised by the province’s
superior courts; whether the powers were judicial in nature; and, whether
the new institutional context had transformed the nature of the powers in
any way that might save the re-allocation as being regarded as upsetting
the traditional allocation of powers.50 In the circumstances of the reference,
the Court held that the re-allocation of certain powers  to make orders
evicting tenants and to make orders to compel compliance with rent
control requirements  failed all three parts. By the Court’s own admission,
this result went somewhat against the grain of preceding decisions that
had generally sanctioned investing administrative tribunals with judicial
functions. Moreover, the Court explicitly acknowledged the aim of
improving both substantive and procedural justice in residential tenancy
matters. Perhaps tellingly though, Dickson J., who wrote on behalf of the
Court, noted that representatives of both tenants and landlords objected to
the transfer of power.51
Given this result, constitutional law on the separation of powers had
the potential to stand in the way of a significant element of administrative
state deployment in the interests of substantive equality. But this potential
was relatively quickly quarantined and, within 15 years, all but deflated.
Only two years later, the Supreme Court gave constitutional approval to a
new residential tenancy regime in Quebec, ostensibly on the grounds that,
historically, the relevant powers were not exclusively exercised by the
superior courts in that province but, rather, had been shared with provincial
49
50
51

[1981] S.C.J. No. 57, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714 (S.C.C.).
Id., at 734.
Id., at 749.
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courts.52 Six years after that, the Court, by majority, put a “gloss” on the
historical inquiry required under the first step by positing that the inquiry
should examine the relative exclusivity of jurisdiction at a national level,
at the time of Confederation.53 Finally, a further 10 years later, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of revisions to the residential tenancies
regime in Nova Scotia that involved powers similar to those that were the
focus in Ontario.54 While this decision was enabled by an adoption of the
national perspective on the historical inquiry, it also appeared to involve
a reappraisal of the historical record even in Ontario. In the period
between the decisions on the Ontario and Nova Scotia references,
Ontario had continued to legislatively revise the substantive terms of
residential tenancy relationships, but dispute resolution was left in the
hand of the courts. Following the Nova Scotia reference decision, the
Ontario government established a new administrative tribunal system for
residential tenancy disputes.55
What looked like a rocky start to the constitutionality of the reallocation of powers relating to residential tenancy disputes now looks
more like a rough patch in a longer term evolution of constitutional law 
under the separation of powers  that has generally facilitated deployment
of administrative state apparatus to address substantive inequality.
Turning to the protective role of constitutional law on the separation of
powers, the Supreme Court, by majority, has recently confirmed that in
establishing the judicial branch of government and, more specifically, the
courts of superior jurisdiction, the Constitution necessarily protects access
to those courts.56 On this basis, the Supreme Court held that the provincial
power to make laws for the administration of justice in the provinces
(under section 92(14)) could not impose hearing fees on parties to
litigation if those fees operated to deny access to the superior courts.57
While this did not mean that hearing fees were necessarily
unconstitutional, it did mean that a hearing fee scheme needed to ensure
that it did not prevent any individual litigants from utilizing the superior
courts. In the particular case, the hearing fee scheme implemented in
52
53

See Quebec (Attorney General) v. Grondin, [1983] S.C.J. No. 78, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 364 (S.C.C.).
See Yeomans v. Sobeys Stores Ltd., [1989] S.C.J. No. 13, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 238, at para. 27

(S.C.C.).
54
See Reference re Amendments to the Residential Tenancies Act (N.S.), [1996] S.C.J.
No. 13, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 186 (S.C.C.).
55
This came via the Tenant Protection Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 24.
56
Trial Lawyers Assn. of British Columbia v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2014]
S.C.J. No. 59, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 31 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B.C. Trial Lawyers”].
57
Id., at para. 77.
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British Columbia was struck down because, although it allowed trial
judges to waive the fee for litigants who were in receipt of certain
specified social assistance benefits or who were “indigent” or “otherwise
impoverished”, the scope of this discretion was regarded as too narrow.
This decision thus sees constitutional law on the separation of powers
playing a protective role in the sense that it will not allow provincial
governments to impose additional burdens on would-be litigants in ways
that exacerbate the negative consequences of existing socio-economic
inequality in relation to the affordability of access to the courts. In
reasoning to this result, the majority in the Supreme Court also invoked the
constitutional principle of the rule of law. In the next section I discuss the
role of this constitutional principle in relation to substantive equality and
access to justice in contexts that do not involve the separation of powers.
3. Fundamental Principles
Constitutional law recognizes a set of constitutional principles that
play a limited role in defining the demands of constitutional law. The
principles recognized so far are: federalism, democracy, constitutionalism
and the rule of law, respect for minorities, and judicial independence.58
The principle of the rule of law has the most immediate relevance to
substantive equality. Before it was invoked by the Supreme Court in a
reinforcing role, in relation to protecting litigants from barriers to access
to justice created by hearing fees in the British Columbia litigation, the
rule of law principle had been directly relied upon to similar effect by
lower courts in other provinces.59 The Nova Scotia Supreme Court
directly relied upon the principle to deem a hearing fee scheme in that
province unconstitutional.60 Similarly, the Ontario Divisional Court had
required that other types of prescribed court fees could also be found
unconstitutional, for violation of the rule of law principle, if they failed

58
Reference re: Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 49
(S.C.C.); Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island,
[1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 83 (S.C.C.).
59
For a broader discussion of this aspect of the rule of law principle, see Kerri A. Froc, “Is
the Rule of Law the Golden Rule? Accessing ‘Justice’ for Canada’s Poor” (2008) 87 Can. Bar Rev.
459 [hereinafter “Froc”].
60
Pleau v. Nova Scotia (Supreme Court, Prothonotary), [1998] N.S.J. No. 526, 186 N.S.R.
(2d) 1 (N.S.S.C.).
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to provide for discretion to waive the fees in the interests of access to
justice.61
The protective role of the rule of law principle evident in these cases
on access to justice and court fees is, however, relatively limited and the
courts have so far generally refused to allow it to play a more expansive
protective role. Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected a claim,
based on the rule of law principle, that sought to protect people with low
incomes, who needed legal services, from the negative impact on their
access to justice of a tax on legal services introduced by the British
Columbia government.62 Likewise, the Supreme Court of Canada refused
leave to appeal from lower court decisions dismissing a claim brought by
the British Columbia branch of the Canadian Bar Association seeking, in
part, a reversal of cuts to legal aid services in the province on the basis
that the cuts worsened barriers to justice and so violated the rule of law
principle.63 It is important to note though that, in each of these instances,
the dismissal was framed in ways that left open the possibility of claims
oriented to similar ends succeeding in the future.64
4. Rights and Freedoms
Constitutional law under the Charter has a mixed record in terms of
facilitating and furthering substantive equality in the socio-economic
sphere. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has long maintained that the

61

Polewsky v. Home Hardware Stores Ltd., [2003] O.J. No. 2908, 66 O.R. (3d) 600 (Ont.

Div. Ct.).
62
British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Christie, [2007] S.C.J. No. 21, [2007] 1 S.C.R.
873, 2007 SCC 21 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Christie”].
63
Canadian Bar Assn. v. British Columbia, [2006] B.C.J. No. 2015, 2006 BCSC 1342, 59
B.C.L.R. (4th) 38 (B.C.S.C.), affd [2008] B.C.J. No. 350, 2008 BCCA 92, 290 D.L.R. (4th) 617
(B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 185 [hereinafter “CBA”].
64
In Christie, supra, note 62, the trial judge had upheld the claim but a majority of the
British Columbia Court of Appeal overturned that decision. As the claim journeyed up the court
hierarchy, it was incrementally re-characterized, by the judiciary, to be less focused on the particular
detrimental impact on low income people. Since it was the re-characterized claim that was rejected,
this leaves the door open to the possibility of a different result in a future claim that is more narrowly
focused, provided that focus can be maintained. For a deeper analysis consistent with this point, see
Froc, supra, note 59. In the CBA case, id., the decisions to dismiss focused on the lack of standing of
the CBA, rather than the lack of merit to the claim, although the question of standing revolved
around the substantive issue of whether there was a serious issue to be tried. A key stumbling block
for establishing the seriousness of the issue was, according to the courts, the generalized nature of
the claim. This leaves the door open to the possibility of a different result in a future claim that is
framed more specifically.
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Charter guarantees not merely formal but also substantive equality.65 In
addition, in an early Charter case it was stated that the section 1
guarantee clause was imbued with the following values that need to be
considered when applying the Charter itself: “respect for the inherent
dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice and equality,
accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and
group identity, and faith in social and political institutions which enhance
the participation of individuals and groups in society”.66 In combination,
these positions would appear to hold significant potential for
constitutional law to validate claims against governmental action that
diminishes substantive equality and governmental inaction that fails to
improve substantive equality.67 Beyond that, the Supreme Court has
confirmed that the guarantee of substantive equality is consistent with the
introduction of ameliorative programs aimed at and restricted to
disadvantaged groups, even where they entail drawing legal distinctions
that involve differential treatment on protected grounds.68 Moreover,
Canadian courts have shown some willingness to revise rules on
litigation standing and costs to acknowledge and ameliorate substantive
inequality in the capacity of socio-economically disadvantaged
individuals and groups to bring forward legal claims under the Charter.69
On the other hand, however, governments have strongly resisted
attempts to have the Charter applied in ways that would either protect
already existing substantive equality measures or require measures to
improve substantive equality. For their part, and in terms of the ultimate
result in cases, Canadian courts have tended to take the governments’
side and so the Charter has rarely prevented governmental measures
65
See, for instance: Symes v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 131, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695, at para.
229 (S.C.C.); Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] S.C.J. No. 24,
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, at para. 18 (S.C.C.); R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483, at
para. 16 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kapp”]; Quebec (Attorney General) v. A., [2013] S.C.J. No. 5, [2013]
1 S.C.R. 61, at para. 36 (S.C.C.).
66
R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at para. 64 (S.C.C.).
67
This potential is consistent with the expectations for s. 15 that were held by the civil
society who engaged its design and drafting, see Porter, supra, note 4.
68
See Kapp, supra, note 65. For an analysis of this case and area, which includes some
compelling arguments that substantive equality requires much more from the Supreme Court’s
approach to ameliorative measures, see Young, “Kapp’ing”, supra, note 4.
69
See, for instance: Canada (Attorney General) v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United
Against Violence Society, [2012] S.C.J. No. 45, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 524, at para. 71 (S.C.C.); Adams,
supra, note 17; British Columbia/Yukon Assn. of Drug War Survivors v. Abbotsford (City), [2015]
B.C.J. No. 733, 37 M.P.L.R. (5th) 12, 2015 BCCA 142, at para. 31 (B.C.C.A.). But there are
counterpoints to these issues as well: CBA, supra, note 63; B.C. Trial Lawyers, supra, note 56.
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diminishing substantive equality, and has not compelled significant
improvements in substantive equality.70 At the same time though, the
Supreme Court’s reasoning has laid doctrinal stepping stones that
provide possibilities for progress in protecting or promoting substantive
equality in the future. Moreover, the prospects for realizing these
possibilities may be strengthened by reasoning in some recent cases in
which the Supreme Court has reversed itself on significant rights claims
due, in part, to concerns about substantive socio-economic inequality.
The most direct claims to protection or improvement in relation to
socio-economic disadvantage and substantive equality are based on
either the section 7 guarantee that no person can be deprived of life,
liberty or security of the person except in accordance with fundamental
justice or the section 15 guarantee of equality before and under the law,
as well as of equal protection and benefit of law. Claims that are less
directly aimed at specific substantive equality measures, but that have
broader relevance for socio-economic inequality, can be advanced under
other Charter provisions. In particular, the section 2 guarantee of
freedom of association has been relied upon in attempts to protect and
promote workers’ rights in relation to collective bargaining and the right
to strike.
In terms of the most direct claims, the two leading examples of the
Supreme Court protecting or requiring substantive equality measures are
its decisions in Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General)71 and
New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.).72
The Eldridge case raised the general question of whether a universally
provided social program  in this case, public health care services 
needed to be provided on a basis that ensured equal access for persons
with disabilities via a claim that deaf patients were entitled to a reinstatement of medical translation services. The Supreme Court upheld
the claim, under section 15, on the general ground that, without the
translation services, deaf patients would not receive equal benefit of the
universally provided health care system. The provision of the translation
services can be regarded as a substantive equality measure, that is, a
measure that responds to differential disadvantage in life circumstances
that is caused by or corresponds to the protected ground of disability.
Therefore, the decision in Eldridge is an example of constitutional law
70
71
72

For a recent overview and critique, see Young, “Social Justice”, supra, note 4.
[1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Eldridge”].
[1999] S.C.J. No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “G. (J.)”].
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requiring a substantive equality measure. In the G. (J.) case, the Supreme
Court upheld a claim that section 7 required that a custodial parent living
on low income, who could not afford to retain legal counsel for child
protection proceedings, had to be provided with state-funded counsel.73
The entitlement to state-funded counsel in these circumstances was a
response to the relative socio-economic disadvantage of people living on
low income and so can also be regarded as an instance of constitutional
law requiring a substantive equality measure.
In addition, substantive equality has been protected and promoted in
some lower court decisions.74 An example is the decision in Adams,75
which upheld a Charter challenge to the impact on people experiencing
street homelessness of a municipal by-law that prohibited the overnight
erection of temporary shelters in public parks. This decision accepted
that the prohibition exacerbated the risks to life and security of the
person that street homelessness already posed and thus enabled the
claimants to invoke the protection offered by section 7.
Unfortunately, viewed as part of the broader landscape of
constitutional law under the Charter, Eldridge, G. (J.) and Adams appear
as relatively isolated moments of support for substantive equality, at least
in terms of results. Although the decisions retain important
jurisprudential validity and force, they are outnumbered by the instances
in which Charter claims seeking to protect or require substantive equality
measures have been rejected. Rejected claims include, for instance: a
claim to protection against a reduction of over 20 per cent in social
assistance rates;76 a claim to protection against a conditional reduction in
social assistance to unemployed younger adults;77 a claim to protection
against withdrawal of essential utility services for inability to pay a
security deposit;78 a claim to provision of therapeutic services for
73
For a deeper and broader consideration of this case and its aftermath, see Kate Kehoe &
David Wiseman, “Reclaiming a Contextualized Approach to the Right to State-Funded Counsel in
Child Protection Cases” (2012) 63 University of New Brunswick L.J. 163.
74
See discussion in Martha Jackman & Bruce Porter, “Rights-Based Strategies to Address
Homelessness and Poverty in Canada: The Charter Framework” in Martha Jackman and
Bruce Porter, eds., Advancing Social Rights in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2014), at 81-95.
75
Supra, note 17.
76
Masse v. Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services), [1996] O.J. No. 363, 134
D.L.R. (4th) 20 (Ont. Div. Ct.) [hereinafter “Masse”].
77
Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gosselin”].
78
Clark v. Peterborough Utilities Commission, [1995] O.J. No. 1743, 24 O.R. (3d) 7, (Ont.
Gen. Div.).
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children with disabilities to enable improved capacity to participate in
society in general;79 and, a claim to protection against anti-panhandling
laws.80 In some of these instances the rejection of the claim has been
primarily based on purported inadequacies in the evidentiary support for
the claims and so there remains a possibility for future progress.81 But in
other instances the scope of the relevant Charter rights have been said to
exclude the particular substantive equality claim. In still other instances
though, where the results and aspects of the supporting reasoning have
gone counter to substantive equality, the reasoning has included other
aspects that are potentially promising doctrinal steps.
An example is the decision in Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney
General)82 that also addressed the public health care system. In Chaoulli
it was held, by all six members of the Supreme Court who addressed the
issue, that the Charter did not require the provision of a public health
care system. At the same time though, they all accepted that, so long as a
public health care system was provided, the Charter applied to it. More
specifically, they all also agreed that the risks to life and security of the
person posed by the combination of undue waiting times for service in
the public system and limitations on the availability of private care, via
constraints on private health insurance, fell within the protective scope of
section 7. Where the judges disagreed with each other was on whether
the regulatory framework giving rise to these risks to life and security of
the person could be regarded as violating principles of fundamental
justice. Three of the six judges found an unjustifiable violation of section 7
and ultimately the result went that way when a similar conclusion was
reached by a fourth judge who applied only the (similar) guarantees
found in the Quebec Charter. This result thus upheld a challenge by a
relatively socio-economically advantaged claimant to a legislative
measure designed to restrict the ability of a private market for health care
services to undermine the effectiveness of the public health care system.
In that sense, the result undermines more than protects or promotes
substantive equality.83 Moreover, the judicial position that constitutional
law under the Charter would not require a broad substantive equality
79
Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J.
No. 71, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 657 (S.C.C.).
80
R. v. Banks, [2001] O.J. No. 3219, 205 D.L.R. (4th) 340 (Ont. C.J.).
81
For example, Gosselin, supra, note 77.
82
[2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chaoulli”].
83
The specific measure at issue in Chaoulli was one that prohibited private health insurance
for services covered by the public system.
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program, such as public health care, is troubling. This underlying lack of
protection or compulsion at the program level reflects the positions taken
in other cases with respect to other types of substantive equality-oriented
social programs, such as social assistance and legal aid.84 On the other
hand though, in recognizing that the operation and impact of the public
health care system can be subject to Charter scrutiny under section 7, a
doctrinal stepping stone was laid for the possibility of future progress on
health-care related claims brought by people experiencing substantive
inequality.
To some extent this record casts doubt upon the Supreme Court’s
basic principle that the Charter guarantees not merely formal but also
substantive equality. At a minimum, this record suggests that substantive
equality may only impose requirements on governments once they elect
to introduce measures to ameliorate socio-economic disadvantage.
Moreover, any requirements of substantive equality may not be allowed
to reach far beyond the framework of Eldridge and so would be quite
weak. A troubling sign of the potentially weak force of substantive
equality under the Charter is the decision of the Court of Appeal of Nova
Scotia that rejected a Charter challenge to legislated provisions that were
interpreted as preventing the province’s monopoly provider of electricity
services from establishing differential service rates for reasons of
substantive inequality (i.e., charging relatively less to customers with a
relatively lower ability to pay).85 Even if it might be reasonable to take
84
On social assistance, see Masse, supra, note 76. On legal aid, note that the courts generally
refuse to take the position that legal aid is required, although they retain the right to stay any
proceedings where a lack of legal aid could render a trial unfair or otherwise violate s. 7 of the
Charter: see, for example, R. v. Prosper, [1994] S.C.J. No. 72, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Rushlow, [2009] O.J. No. 2335, 96 O.R. (3d) 302, 2009 ONCA 461 (Ont. C.A.). One counterpoint to
this general refusal to hold that the Charter requires particular programs is provided by the Supreme
Court’s decision to overturn the federal government’s refusal to renew a regulatory exemption that
permitted the creation and operation of a safe injection and drug treatment facility and program in
Vancouver, see: PHS, supra, note 32. Canadian courts have also gone to some strange lengths to avoid
relying upon ss. 7 and 15 to provide protection from cutbacks to social programs. For example, in
Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care v. Canada (Attorney General), [2014] F.C.J. No. 679, 2014 FC
651 (F.C.) (under appeal to the F.C.A.), the Federal Court held that the cancellation of health care
services to refugee claimants violated the Charter primarily by violating the s. 12 guarantee against
cruel and unusual treatment, although it also held that s. 15 had been violated, but not s. 7.
85
Boulter v. Nova Scotia Power Inc., [2009] N.S.J. No. 64, 275 N.S.R. (2d) 214, 2009
NSCA 17 (N.S.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 172 (S.C.C.). For a
description and analysis of this claim and the circumstances behind it, see Claire MacNeil & Vincent
Calderhead, “Access to Energy: How Form Overtook Substance and Disempowered the Poor in
Nova Scotia” in Martha Jackman and Bruce Porter, eds., Advancing Social Rights in Canada,
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2014), at 253.
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the position that the Charter’s guarantee of substantive equality does not
require differential service rates in order to ameliorate substantive
inequality, it is very difficult to see how it can tolerate a legislative
provision that pre-emptively prohibits consideration of whether
substantive inequality ought to be taken into account. It should be noted
though that the Supreme Court has at least been careful to enable
provincial anti-discrimination human rights codes to advance a notion of
substantive equality that is consistent with the Eldridge framework. For
example, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the British Columbia
Human Right Tribunal that required the government of British Columbia
to reinstate the therapeutic services made available to children with
disabilities seeking to participate in the public education system.86
In terms of the less direct claims to substantive equality that rely upon
the section 2 guarantee of freedom of expression, constitutional law under
the Charter has done an about-face on the issues of whether the section
provides protection for the right to strike and to collectively bargain.87
Although those rights have now been held to be protected, the Supreme
Court has suggested that the protections may be more procedural than
substantive, at least with respect to collective bargaining.88 Moreover, and
more disturbingly from the perspective of substantive equality, although
the Supreme Court has disapproved the wide-ranging denial of freedom of
association rights to agricultural workers89  some of the most socioeconomically disadvantaged employees  it has nevertheless approved
their ongoing exclusion from the regular system of labour relations and
86
Moore v. British Columbia (Education), [2012] S.C.J. No. 61, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 360
(S.C.C.). More broadly, the endorsement of the Supreme Court is seen as important because it has
been argued that statutory human rights tribunals tend to advance a more robust notion of
substantive equality, which may end up informing the Supreme Court’s own approach. For a
discussion of this interplay, see Bruce Ryder, “The Strange Double Life of Canadian Equality
Rights” in B.L. Berger, J. Cameron & S. Lawrence, eds., Constitutional Cases 2012 (2013) 63
S.C.L.R. (2d) 261.
87
Labour Trilogy: Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta), [1987]
S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.); Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada, [1987]
S.C.J. No. 9, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 (S.C.C.); Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v.
Saskatchewan, [1987] S.C.J. No. 8, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.). The about-face is represented by,
on protection of the right to strike, Saskatchewan, supra, note 1 and, on protection of collective
bargaining, Health Services and Support  Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British
Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, 2007 SCC 27 (S.C.C.) and Mounted Police
Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 1, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2015
SCC 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mounted Police Association of Ontario”].
88
Health Services and Support  Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British
Columbia, id.
89
Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 (S.C.C.).
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their relegation to a regulatory regime with relatively minimalist “good
faith” protections.90 This situation exists despite the explicit reliance on
Anatole France’s aphorism in the recent Supreme Court decision that
constituted the judicial about-face on Charter protection for the right to
strike.91 Specifically, Abella J. cited the aphorism in the course of rejecting
the minority view that, as Her Honour saw it, attributed equivalence
between the power of employees and employers. According to Abella J.,
the minority view “turns labour relations on its head, and ignores the
fundamental power imbalance which the entire history of modern labour
relations legislation has been scrupulously devoted to rectifying”.92 On the
one hand, this invocation of the need to be vigilant about substantive
inequality sits awkwardly with the endorsement of lesser rights for
agricultural workers. On the other hand, that a concern for substantive
inequality played a role in the decision to reverse the exclusion of
significant labour rights from the Charter offers hope for future substantive
equality claims in labour and other socio-economic contexts.
Charter-based constitutional law thus has a mixed record on
substantive equality and socio-economic inequality. The Charter has
generally been allowed to play a facilitative role, consistent with other
areas of constitutional law, in the sense that it has not been allowed to be
used to block substantive equality measures,93 although Chaoulli has
raised some concerns about that. At the same time though, the Charter
has rarely required substantive equality measures and the courts have
regularly refused to allow it to provide protection from measures that
diminish substantive equality in the socio-economic realm. Nevertheless,
it is worth emphasizing that the accumulated constitutional doctrine
contains potentially useful stepping stones for more positive progress on
substantive equality claims in the future. Those stepping stones include:

90

Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, [2011] S.C.J. No. 20, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
Saskatchewan, supra, note 1.
92
Id., at para. 56. In a subsequent rejoinder, one of the minority judges (Rothstein J.), noted
that the majority’s decisions offered a greater degree of protection to already relatively advantaged
groups of workers  public servants and police officers (see Mounted Police Association of
Ontario, supra, note 87, at para. 240).
93
Per Dickson J.: “In interpreting and applying the Charter I believe that the courts must be
cautious to ensure that it does not simply become an instrument of better situated individuals to roll
back legislation which has as its object the improvement of the condition of less advantaged
persons”, R. v. Edward Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, at 136
(S.C.C.).
91
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the recognition of a right of patients who are deaf to assistive services for
communication with medical practitioners (Eldridge); the recognition of
a right to state-funded counsel in child protection matters (G. (J.)); the
recognition of the detrimental impact of a prohibition on erecting
temporary shelters on the rights to life and security of the person of
people who are street homeless (Adams); and the recognition of the
relationship between timely access to public medical services and the
rights to life and security of the person (Chaoulli). The mixed record thus
far though is particularly concerning for the future of constitutional law
and substantive equality because the Charter is the part of constitutional
law that is most directly designed and empowered to regulate the policy
choices that governments make with respect to citizens.
It is beyond the scope of this article to undertake a thorough analysis
of the reasons for the unwillingness of the courts and governments to
support a greater role for the Charter in protecting and requiring
substantive equality but the main determining factors can be easily
enough drawn from accumulated Charter scholarship. For present
purposes, the reasons for the Charter’s mixed record can be grouped
under three main categories that are mutually-influencing and
reinforcing: doctrinal, institutional and ideological. Doctrinally,
governments and the courts have often adopted conceptions of particular
rights and freedoms, and associated legal concepts and principles, that
are inherently or contingently limited in their ability to acknowledge and
enable substantive equality. A key example of this is the use of
comparator group analysis in section 15 equality jurisprudence.94
Another example is the conception of “deprivation” under section 7 as
entailing a taking away, rather than a failure to provide,95 as well as the
preference for a predominantly civil and political, rather than social and
economic, understanding of the scope of circumstances that can threaten
“life, liberty and security of the person”.96 Institutionally, governments
94
See: Daphne Gilbert, “Critical Comparisons: The Supreme Court of Canada Dooms
Section 15” (2006) 24:1 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 111; Margot Young, “Social Justice
and the Charter: Comparison and Choice” (2013) 50:3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 669.
95
Contrasting interpretations of “deprivation” are evident in Gosselin, supra, note 77, in
the judgments of McLachlin C.J.C. (at para. 81, suggesting limitation to a taking away) and Arbour
J. (at para. 321, arguing can also include withholding). See also, Alison M. Latimer, “A Positive
Future for Section 7? Children and Charter Change” (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 537, at 539 and
Martha Jackman, “Charter Remedies for Socio-Economic Rights Violations: Sleeping Under a
Box?” in Kent Roach & Robert J. Sharpe eds., Taking Remedies Seriously (Montreal: Canadian
Institute for the Administration of Justice, 2010), at 281-85.
96
Hogg, supra, note 29, at para. 44.8.
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have been hostile to, and the courts have been wary of, the democratic
legitimacy and policy-making competence of judicial intervention in
law-making in areas of social regulation that implicate Charter rights and
freedoms.97 This hostility and wariness has generally operated to reduce
the scope of judicial interpretation and enforcement of Charter rights and
freedoms and, moreover, that narrowing effect has been applied
disproportionately in relation to claims impugning social and economic
policy making.98 Finally, ideologically, since around the time of the
introduction of the Charter, Canadian governments, not to mention others
throughout the Western world, have gradually weakened their
commitment to, if they have not turned decidedly against, the ideals of
the social welfare state, including socio-economic equality.99 Canadian
courts have, to say the least, not resisted this ideological shift and appear
generally ambivalent about lending their doctrinal and institutional
power to defending or promoting socio-economic equality and
distributive justice.100 Some Canadian judges, in some cases and in some
extra-judicial speeches, express sympathy for the plight of the socioeconomically disadvantaged, but that has rarely translated into a
courtroom victory.101

97
For an overview of the distinction between legitimacy and competency oriented
arguments, as well as an analysis of the role of the latter, see David Wiseman, “Competence
Concerns in Charter Adjudication: Countering the Anti-Poverty Incompetence Argument” (2006) 51
McGill L.J. 503 [hereinafter “Wiseman, ‘Competence Concerns’”] and David Wiseman, “Managing
the Burden of Doubt: Social Science Evidence, Institutional Competence of Courts and the Prospects
for Anti-poverty Charter Claims” (2014) 33 N.J.C.L. 1 [hereinafter “Wiseman, ‘Burden of Doubt’”].
See also Hester A. Lessard, “Dollars Versus [Equality] Rights: Money and the Limits on Distributive
Justice” in J. Cameron & S. Lawrence, eds. (2012) 58 S.C.L.R. 299 [hereinafter “Lessard”].
98
See Wiseman, id.
99
For a discussion of the relationship between the rise of neo-liberalism, welfare reform and
notions of social citizenship, with a particular focus on Ontario, see: Janet Mosher, “Welfare Reform and
the Re-Making of the Model Citizen” in its role in Margot Young et al., eds., Poverty: Rights, Social
Citizenship and Legal Activism (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007).
100
See Joel Bakan, Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1997); Andrew Petter, “Wealthcare: The Politics of the Charter Revisited” in The
Politics of the Charter: The Illusive Promise of Constitutional Rights (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2010); Lessard, supra, note 97.
101
For example, MacLachlin C.J.C. expressed sympathy for the claimant in her judgment in
Gosselin, while rejecting her claim. In the same case, Arbour J. was a lone voice in support of
constitutionalizing protections for social welfare rights.
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5. Aboriginal Rights: Section 35
The relationship between constitutional law and social justice for the
First Nations, Métis and Inuit peoples of Canada is predominantly
characterized by the failure of constitutional law to impede a long history
of colonial and neo-colonial governmental action that has created and
exacerbated both formal and substantive inequality.102 Indeed, the
Canadian constitutional order is founded upon an assertion of
sovereignty over Aboriginal Peoples that is increasingly recognized as
lacking legal and political legitimacy,103 and yet Canadian constitutional
law has generally been unwilling to confront that problem. Moreover,
and until recently, constitutional law has tolerated systemic disregard for
historic treaties with, and other key undertakings to, Aboriginal Peoples
and, in this sense, has acted as a willing facilitator of the social injustice
that disproportionately characterizes the situation of many Aboriginal
communities and people.104
It was hoped that Canadian constitutional law might be able to chart
a different course with the embedding, as part of the constitutional
renewal of 1982, of the section 35 declaration that “existing aboriginal
and treaty rights” would be “recognized and affirmed”.105 The meaning
and significance of section 35 remains very much a work-in-progress.
102
The history of colonialism is amply documented in Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples, The Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Volume 1: Looking Forward,
Looking Back (Canada Communication Group: Ottawa, 1996), particularly c. 6 “Stage Three:
Displacement and Assimilation” at 130. The contemporary substantive inequality of Aboriginal people
is attested to in, for example, David Macdonald & Daniel Wilson, Poverty or Prosperity: Indigenous
children in Canada (Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives; Ottawa, 2013), online:
<https://www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/reports/poverty-or-prosperity>. This publication reports
that Indigenous children are over two and a half times more likely to live in poverty than nonIndigenous children.
103
John Borrows, Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2002), in particular c. 5, “Questioning Canada’s Title to Land: The Rule of
Law, Aboriginal Peoples, and Colonialism”; B. Slattery, “Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the
Crown” (2005) 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 433 at 437; Michael Asch, “From Terra Nullius to Affirmation:
Reconciling Aboriginal Rights with the Canadian Constitution” (2002) 17:2 C.J.L.S. 23.
104
In numerous cases the Supreme Court has held that general provincial laws that operate
to restrict or prohibit traditional and treaty-based Aboriginal hunting rights are allowed to have that
effect under the federal Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5 and the associated exclusive federal
jurisdiction over Indians (s. 92(24)). In so doing, the Supreme Court has typically dismissed or
ignored arguments that treaty rights should be accorded more protection and a higher constitutional
status. See, for instance, R. v. Sikyea, [1964] S.C.J. No. 42, [1964] S.C.R. 642 (S.C.C.) and
R. v. George, [1966] S.C.J. No. 7, [1966] S.C.R. 267 (S.C.C.). Prior to the entrenchment of s. 35 of
the Constitution, it was accepted that federal legislation could extinguish treaty rights: see Hogg,
supra, note 29, at 27.5(e).
105
Constitution, s. 35.
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At particular points in time, the potential for positive impact on socioeconomic inequality for Aboriginal Peoples and the trajectory of decisions
and doctrine in section 35 cases have been assessed optimistically and
pessimistically.106 Rather than survey the ups and downs of what is already
a sizeable body of jurisprudence, in this section I will briefly discuss the
extent to which constitutional law under section 35 has been formulated
to acknowledge and accommodate the already existing socio-economic
inequality of those individuals and communities whose rights it articulates
and whose negotiations and litigations over those rights it purports to
facilitate.
An example of a lack of acknowledgment and accommodation of
already existing socio-economic inequality is the judicial formulation of
Aboriginal title and the associated encouragement to negotiate rather
than litigate the underlying issues. As formulated in Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia,107 Aboriginal title is subject to both an inherent
limitation and to justified infringement. The inherent limitation is that the
title lands cannot be utilized by the holders of Aboriginal title in ways
that are “irreconcilable with the nature of the [prior] occupation of that
land and the relationship that the particular group has had with the
land”.108 In addition, governments are entitled to infringe on Aboriginal
title to advance a wide array of public policy objectives, provided the
infringements are not disproportionate to the objectives and that they
comply with associated obligations to consult and compensate. Having
formulated Aboriginal title in this way, the Supreme Court concluded
with an encouragement to negotiate, rather than litigate, Aboriginal title
claims. The establishment of a constitutional right to Aboriginal title
under section 35 is a development that has significant potential to
improve substantive equality for Aboriginal Peoples. Yet the terms of its
formulation and the encouragement to negotiate can be criticized for
failing to acknowledge or accommodate already existing socio-economic
inequality. Specifically, in formulating the inherent limit, the Supreme
Court appears to constrain the Aboriginal title-holders to land-uses that
are reconcilable with the nature of the relationship they had to the land at
For example, see Darlene Johnston, “Lo, How Sparrow Has Fallen: A Retrospective of
the Supreme Court of Canada’s Section 35 Jurisprudence” in Julia Bass, William A. Bogart &
Frederick H. Zemans, eds., Access to Justice for a New Century – The Way Forward (Toronto: Law
Society of Upper Canada, 2005).
107
[1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Delgamuukw”].
108
Id., at para. 128, per Lamer C.J.C.
106
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a time when they were autonomous and sustainable communities not yet
subjected to the substantive inequality wrought by colonialism. To
prohibit uses of land that may have been inconceivable in the past, but
that are appropriate and feasible for a contemporary Aboriginal
community that is experiencing significant socio-economic disadvantage,
may doom the community to perpetual substantive inequality.
Admittedly, an Aboriginal community caught in this bind always has the
option of surrendering the land to the government on terms that would
enable it to undertake uses that would violate the inherent limit, but that
leads to another problematic aspect of the Delgamuukw decision.
Specifically, whether negotiating the terms of a surrender to circumvent
the inherent limit, or negotiating the terms of a proposed infringement of
Aboriginal title, or negotiating the settlement of an Aboriginal title claim,
an inequality of bargaining capacity may arise for Aboriginal
communities that are already experiencing circumstances of socioeconomic disadvantage. Moreover, by formulating Aboriginal title in a
way that seeks to offer internal mechanisms for balancing Aboriginal and
governmental interests  that is, the mechanisms of the inherent limit
and justified infringement  the Supreme Court undermines the
bargaining position of Aboriginal communities. Aboriginal communities
might have had a much stronger bargaining position if Aboriginal title
had been formulated without internal limitations, thereby necessitating
that governments bargain not merely over how to balance the respective
interests but also for the opportunity to balance interests at all. Given the
socio-economic disadvantage of many Aboriginal communities, it could
be expected that there would ultimately be mutual interest in balancing,
but the Aboriginal communities would be starting with a stronger
bargaining position that could help them to both compensate for any
relative disadvantage in bargaining capacity and to reach a deal that
better ameliorates their broader socio-economic inequality.
Some concerns can thus be raised about the extent to which the
foundational decision of constitutional law on Aboriginal title
acknowledges and accommodates the existing socio-economic inequality
of Aboriginal Peoples. On the other hand, and at the other end of the
spectrum of acknowledgment and accommodation, Canadian courts
have established a doctrinal basis for Aboriginal claimants to seek
advanced costs and other cost-sharing and cost-subsidizing arrangements
with the governments against whom they are bringing claims under
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section 35.109 In the middle of the spectrum are developing approaches to
the impact of socio-economic inequality on the capacity of Aboriginal
communities to participate in processes associated with the constitutionally
imposed duty on governments to consult on any measures that may impact
on rights protected by section 35.110
Overall then, the relationship between constitutional law and substantive
equality for Aboriginal Peoples is currently emerging from a long history of
colonialism. The associated dispossession and discrimination, which was
both tolerated and facilitated by constitutional law, has wrought the worst
circumstances of socio-economic inequality in contemporary Canada. The
relatively recent constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal title and rights
under section 35 potentially allows constitutional law to make amends by
establishing and protecting those entitlements in ways that will lead to
improvements in substantive equality for Aboriginal Peoples. But there are
already signs of an inconsistent appreciation for the relevance of existing
socio-economic inequality.
6. Other Constitutional Provisions and Constitutional Values
Another constitutional provision that has the potential to play a role in
relation to ameliorating socio-economic inequality is section 36. This section
commits the federal and provincial governments to: “(a) promoting equal
opportunities for the well-being of Canadians; (b) furthering economic
development to reduce disparity in opportunities and (c) providing essential
public services of reasonable quality to all Canadians”. Since equal
opportunity for well-being and the provision of essential public services
can both be understood as relevant to protecting and advancing
substantive equality, there is potential for either level of government, or
individuals, to invoke this provision when governmental action appears
inconsistent with these constitutional commitments. Thus far, however,
section 36 has rarely been invoked and, to the limited extent that it has
109
See British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, [2003] S.C.J. No.
76, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 371, 2003 SCC 71, at paras. 27-31 (S.C.C.). See also: Brian McLaughlin, Cheryl
Tobias & Craig Cameron, “Interim Costs: The Impact of Okanagan Indian Band” (2005) 54
U.N.B.L.J. 126.
110
See Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, [2004]
3 S.C.R. 511, 2004 SCC 73 (S.C.C.). On capacity-building funding generally, see Dwight G.
Newman, The Duty to Consult: New Relationships with Aboriginal Peoples (Saskatoon: Purich
Publishing Ltd., 2009), at 38, 73.
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been judicially considered, there have been mixed views on whether it is
capable of giving rise to enforceable obligations.111
Even though section 36 might not be directly enforceable, it could
still play a role if regarded as a relevant source of constitutional values
that could inform the broader development of constitutional law. This
would be akin to the role that Charter values have been allowed to play
in the development of the common law in disputes between private
parties. As I will now briefly discuss, the role of Charter values in
disputes between private parties is a final way in which constitutional
law has been relevant to social justice. An example is the recognition that
the Charter’s guarantee of freedom of expression gives rise to an important
corresponding Charter value that needed to be considered when the courts
were reviewing the application of the common law on tortious interference
with contracting to a situation of secondary picketing associated with a
labour dispute.112 While each specific Charter right and freedom would
therefore seem to establish a Charter value relevant to the common law, it
is also the case that the Charter values recognized as imbued in the section 1
guarantee clause  including the value of “social justice and equality” 
could be relevant to development of the common law as well.113
In sum then, looking back, in a variety of legal areas, constitutional
law has generally been willing to facilitate governmental action aimed at
improving substantive equality. Very occasionally, under the Charter, it
has gone further than facilitating by requiring substantive equality
measures. More regularly though, under the Charter, constitutional law
has refused to protect or mandate substantive equality in relation to
socio-economic inequality and social injustice. Nevertheless, even where
courts have rejected substantive equality oriented Charter claims, their
reasoning has either left the door open to or laid some stepping stones for
future progress. One way to interpret the overall trajectory of the past of
111

For a view that s. 36 might create enforceable rights, see Manitoba Keewatinowi
Okimakanak Inc. v. Manitoba Hydro-Electric Board, [1992] M.J. No. 218, 91 D.L.R. (4th) 554, at
para. 10 (Man. C.A.). For a view that it does not, see CBA, supra, note 63, at para. 118, per Brenner
C.J.S.C. For a broader discussion of this issue, see Martha Jackman & Bruce Porter, “Rights-Based
Strategies to Address Homelessness and Poverty in Canada: The Constitutional Framework” (2013-10)
University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, Working Paper Series at 11-19, online: <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2348724>.
112
Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada
Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] S.C.J. No. 7, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156 (S.C.C.).
113
For a judicial effort to enlist Charter values in adding a substantive equality dimension to
the common law conception of trespass as applied to public property, see R. v. A. (S.), [2011] A.J.
No. 986, 52 Alta. L.R. (5th) 85, 2011 ABPC 269 (Alta. Prov. Ct.).
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constitutional law in relation to social justice is to say that it has been
characterized both by a gradual acceptance of the importance of
substantive equality and by a very cautious, and not always forward
moving, approach to steering constitutional law to that end. In the next
section, I consider an element of Charter jurisprudence that may be
relevant to determining whether constitutional law will head more, or
less, in the direction of the realization of socio-economic equality over
the next few decades.

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: MOVING
FORWARD (UNDER THE CHARTER)
The relationship between constitutional law under the Charter and
social justice reflects the trajectory of the past of constitutional law more
generally. In pronouncing the dictates of the Charter, Canadian courts
have generally refused to allow it to block governmental measures aimed
at addressing substantive inequality. At the same time though, they have
only sometimes enabled the Charter to protect or require substantive
equality in the face of governmental retrenchment or inaction. This
despite a recognition, at least on the part of the Supreme Court’s now
long-serving Chief Justice, that the expansive wording of the Charter’s
equality guarantee was meant as an encouragement to meaningful
judicial action.114 When understood in terms of the mixed record of the
Charter in relation to socio-economic inequality, it can be said that, at
least in terms of realization, the constitutional conception of equality is
more majestic than substantive. While some steps towards substantive
equality have been taken, and some stepping stones for the future have
been laid, overall progress has been restrained and cautious.
A certain level of restraint and caution in the judicial expression of
constitutional law under the Charter is, in a constitutional democracy,
probably as it should be. The Charter enables courts to overrule the products
of an electorally-accountable governing institution and there are good
reasons to be skeptical about the desirability, legitimacy and capacity of too
114

In extra-judicial writing on the challenges that Canadian judges have faced in giving
meaning to the Charter’s equality guarantee, McLachlin C.J.C. stated that the expansive wording of
the guarantee was the framers’ means of giving “the courts clear, unequivocal instructions: This is a
guarantee of equality. Take it seriously. Don’t cut it down. Interpret it in a meaningful and expansive
way.” See The Right Honourable B. McLachlin, P.C., “Equality: The Most Difficult Right” (2001)
14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 17, at 17.
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great a role for government-by-courts.115 Moreover, in the broader context of
national and global social, economic, technological and political forces, the
impact of constitutional law and adjudication under the Charter to drive
change may be quite limited overall, even if there are also some moments of
special significance.116 Nevertheless, the Charter has its own democratic
pedigree and the courts have long constituted an essential element of
systems of democratic governance. The issue for judicial expression of
constitutional law under the Charter is therefore not so much whether the
courts should overrule governments in defence of constitutional rights and
freedoms but, rather, when and to what degree they should do so.117 To the
extent that seeking to protect and advance a constitutional conception of
substantive equality is accepted as a touchstone for when and to what degree
courts should intervene under the Charter, the question arises of how to steer
constitutional law in that direction. In my view, whether meaningful
progress can be made in that direction will depend upon the willingness of
the courts to undertake a multi-dimensional shift in their approach to the
Charter. The shift needs to take place across the doctrinal, institutional and
ideological dimensions of Charter adjudication. In this section I will identify
and discuss one potential area for change that implicates all of these
dimensions, namely, the approach to the problem of polycentricity or, to
phrase it more simply, the problem of social policy complexity.
An argument commonly invoked by governments and courts in
rejecting claims seeking to protect or require substantive equality measures
in the socio-economic realm is that such measures are typically but
one aspect of a broader and multifaceted social policy engagement that
involves a complex web of interactions among an array of regulatory
programs and measures. As such, the design and operation of any one
measure will be connected to the design and operation of a network of other
measures. Adjustments to one specific measure will have implications and
reverberations across at least part of the broader network of measures within
115
For expressions of concern about government-by-courts, see Andrew Petter, The Politics
of the Charter: The Illusive Promise of Constitutional Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2010); Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto:
Thomson Educational Publishing, Inc., 1994); Janet Heibert, Limiting Rights: The Dilemma of
Judicial Review (Montreal & Kingston: McGill Queen’s University Press, 1996).
116
See W.A. Bogart, Courts and Country: The Limits of Litigation and the Social and
Political Life of Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1994). See also Harry W. Arthurs,
“Governing the Canadian State: The Constitution in an Era of Globalization, Neo-Liberalism,
Populism, De-centralization and Judicial Activism” (2003) 13 Constitutional Forum 60.
117
Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001).
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which it is situated. In legal scholarship, and in Charter case law, this has at
times been referred to as the problem of “polycentricity”, which reference
draws on the work of Lon Fuller who identified polycentric situations as
posing challenges for adjudicative decision-making processes.118 More
commonly, scholars, legal advocates and judges use the more simple
nomenclature of social policy complexity.119 Complexity of this sort is
seen as a “problem” because it makes it difficult to separately investigate
the effect of any one measure or to understand and analyze the impact of
adjusting just one measure. In the context of Charter adjudication, this
means that it is difficult to assess the extent to which an alleged violation
of rights or freedoms can be attributed to any one measure. As well, it is
difficult to assess whether adjusting any one measure will necessarily
produce a better result for relevant rights and freedoms, either for the
immediate claimant or for others who might be impacted as the broader
system reacts to the particular adjustment. In a nutshell, the existence of
complexity highlights the artificiality of focusing Charter scrutiny on a
single governmental action (or inaction), because many governmental
actions (and inactions) are undertaken as part of a broader collection of
actions.
Government lawyers have regularly raised the problem of social
policy complexity as a basis for urging Canadian courts to hold that
particular claims, especially in relation to substantive equality measures,
ought to be held to be injusticiable (that is, not within the scope of the
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter) or, if violations are
found, ought to be held to a lower, more deferential standard of scrutiny
under section 1. Canadian courts have often accepted these arguments
and, in doing so, have acquiesced in an interlocking set of doctrinal,
See Lon L. Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) 92 Harvard Law Rev.
353. For a discussion of the idea and impact of polycentricity in social rights adjudication in general,
see J. King, “The Pervasiveness of Polycentricity”, Public Law (2008) 101-24. The term
“polycentricity” was first referred to in Charter case law in M. v. H., [1999] S.C.J. No. 23, [1999] 2
S.C.R. 3, per Bastarache J. at para. 310 (S.C.C.). The term was referred to somewhat earlier in an
administrative law context in Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[1998] S.C.J. No. 46, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, at para. 36 (S.C.C.).
119
An example of a scholar referring to the problems posed by “complex policy issues” is
provided by Christopher P. Manfredi, “Déjà vu All Over Again: Chaoulli and the Limits of Judicial
Policy-making” in Colleen M. Flood, Kent Roach & Lorne Sossin, Access to Care, Access to
Justice: The Legal Debate Over Private Health Insurance in Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2005), at 140. For a recent judicial example, see Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of
Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567, at paras. 35, 37, 53 and 56 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Hutterian Brethren”].
118
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institutional and ideological positions that, although highly contestable,
and sometimes judicially questioned, continue to exert explicit or implicit
influence in Charter adjudication.120 The doctrinal position is that
the traditional focus of constitutional human rights laws, and cases, is
singular governmental legal “attacks” or intrusions on the formal
equality (and negative liberty) of citizens.121 As singular events, these
legal actions can be impugned and assessed on their own terms and
without much attention to broader legal context, let alone broader social
context. The corollary of this position is that action or inaction that
diminishes or fails to improve substantive equality (or positive liberty) of
citizens are more likely to be excluded from the scope of Charter scrutiny
or, if included, are more likely to receive a lower degree of Charter
regulation. The institutional reinforcement for this position comes
through an argument that, as compared to democratically elected
legislatures, and their associated governmental policy-making processes,
the courts, in conducting Charter review, are comparatively less
competent in complex/polycentric policy areas and comparatively less
legitimate in non-traditional areas of human rights.122 Finally, the
ideological reinforcement exists in the libertarian/neo-liberal hostility to
the social welfare state, to social and economic human rights, to
substantive equality, to positive liberty (and so on), as well as
stigmatization and stereotyping of people from historically
disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, including those living on low
income or in receipt of social assistance.123 To the extent that these
ideological tendencies inform the prevailing political winds, they can
easily blow into Charter adjudication and decision-making, especially if
120

See Wiseman, supra, note 97.
This doctrinal position has been expressed in the supposed distinction, oft-repeated by
Canadian judges, between individual-antagonizing criminal justice measures and group-mediating
social policy measures. Reliance on this distinction has waxed and waned. It was utilized in, for
instance, McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] S.C.J. No. 122, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 (S.C.C.),
disavowed in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3
S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.), but then invoked in Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 119. For discussion of the
distinction, and its incoherence, as well as its apparent revival, see Wiseman, “Competence
Concerns” and “Burden of Doubt”, supra, note 97.
122
For discussion of this argument, see Wiseman, supra, note 97.
123
See Martha Jackman, “Reality Checks: Presuming Innocence and Proving Guilt in
Charter Welfare Cases”, D. Pothier “But It’s For Your Own Good”, D. Schneiderman, “Social
Rights and ‘Common Sense’: Gosselin through a Media Lens” in Young, “Poverty”, supra, note 37;
Marie-Eve Sylvestre & Céline Bellot, “Challenging Discriminatory and Punitive Responses to
Homelessness in Canada” in Martha Jackman and Bruce Porter, eds., Advancing Social Rights in
Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2014).
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it is the case, as has been argued, that judges are prone to social and
political conservatism.124
The point I want to make about the invocation of the problem of
complexity in Charter adjudication is not so much that the problem does not
exist or is not of real significance. Although I have argued elsewhere, and
still maintain, that governments and courts tend to overstate the problem,
and tend to over-react to it, especially in social rights cases, that is not to
argue that there is not a real problem to be grappled with.125 Rather, my
point is that the response to the problem needs to be re-thought, at least if
there is going to be much hope for constitutional law to protect or advance
substantive equality. The prevailing response of governments and courts to
the problem of complexity is, as I have outlined, to deny or dilute the scope
or degree of Charter protection offered to substantive equality claims that
impugn specific governmental actions (or inactions) that are complex.
One strategy pursued by substantive equality claimants and advocates
has been to offer an alternative framework for adjudication of substantive
equality issues under the Charter. This alternative framework focuses
attention on the overall ends or outcomes, rather than any one specific
means, of governmental action in complex policy-making areas. The
purpose of offering this alternative framework is to enable courts to assess
whether the overall ends or outcomes are achieving the realization of
substantive equality, without needing to attribute deficiencies to any one
particular measure. In addition, this framework would enable courts to
identify and declare when action is needed to protect or improve substantive
equality, while leaving it to governments to determine which adjustments, to
one or more policy measures, will best achieve the required results. In this
way, the alternative framework enables the courts to avoid the pitfalls of
intervening in polycentric situations.
This alternative framework is evident in a substantive equalityoriented Charter case that has recently been before the courts but was
124
Joel Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1997) in particular c. 7, “Judges and Dominant Ideology”, at 103-17.
125
See, Wiseman, supra, note 97. That the recognition of and response to the problem of
complexity/polycentricity is skewed against substantive equality claims is evident in the apparent
willingness of the courts to overlook or overcome the problem in two recent decisions involving the
obviously complex situations of prostitution (Bedford  although sex-workers do tend to be socioeconomically disadvantaged, this was not the prime focus of the case) and physician-assisted suicide
(Carter  in this case, some attention was given to the substantive inequality argument that only
socio-economically advantaged people could avoid the domestic prohibition on physician-assisted
suicide by travelling to other international jurisdictions with no such prohibition).
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dismissed at the very threshold of Charter adjudication. The case,
Tanudjaja v. Canada (Attorney General),126 involved a claim that the
harms and inequalities afflicting individuals experiencing homelessness
and inadequate housing represent a failure of the Canadian and Ontario
governments to implement effective strategies to ensure realization of the
rights protected by sections 7 and 15 of the Charter. The claim was
explicitly aimed at prompting systemic change to improve the outcomes
of governmental action in relation to the life circumstances of people
experiencing homelessness and inadequate housing and so, in general
terms, aimed to improve substantive equality in the socio-economic
realm. A key remedy being sought was an order that the respective levels
of government must develop and implement an “effective national and
provincial strategy to reduce and eliminate homelessness and inadequate
housing”.127 As such, the claim in Tanudjaja offered the courts a
framework for applying the Charter to complex circumstances of social
injustice without artificially isolating one aspect of governmental action
or requiring an impossible level of judicial expertise in assessing the
adjustments that would need to be made to ensure the relevant rights and
freedoms were realized. The Tanudjaja framework achieves this by, first,
allowing a court to hold that it is the prevailing circumstances of
homelessness and inadequate housing, rather than any particular
governmental measure causing them, that constitute the rights violations.
Next, the Tanudjaja framework allows a court to rely on either the
apparent arbitrariness and disproportionality of these circumstances, or
the absence of a national strategy that might demonstrably justify them,
or both, to refuse to excuse the violations under section 1. Finally, the
Tanudjaja framework allows a court to adopt a remedial approach 
ordering the development and implementation of a national strategy 
that acknowledges and respects the social policy complexity and the
policy-making expertise of governments.
126
Tanudjaja, Arsenault, Mahmood, Dubourdieu and the Centre for Equality Rights in
Accommodation v. Canada (Attorney General) and Ontario (Attorney General), Court File
No. CV-10-403688. A motion to dismiss was heard and upheld by the Superior Court, see:
Tanudjaja v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] O.J. No. 4078, 116 O.R. (3d) 574, 2013 ONSC
5410 (Ont. S.C.J.). That ruling was upheld by a majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal in
Tanudjaja v. Canada (Attorney General), [2014] O.J. No. 5689, 123 O.R. (3d) 161, 2014 ONCA 852
(Ont. C.A.). An application for leave to appeal has recently been dismissed by the Supreme Court of
Canada, [2015] S.C.C.A. No. 39 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Tanudjaja”].
127
Notice of Application (Tanudjaja v. Canada (Attorney General), Court File No. CV-10403688), at 3. This and other court documents for the case are available online:
<http://socialrightscura.ca/eng/legal-strategies.html#charter-challenge>.
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Despite constructively offering this alternative framework for
acknowledging and managing the complexity of social policy in relation to
homelessness and adequate housing, the Tanudjaja claim was met with stiff
opposition from the respondent governments who brought motions to have
the action summarily dismissed for want of a reasonable cause of action.
The motion was accepted by the Ontario Superior Court and that decision
was upheld by a majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal (with the Supreme
Court of Canada refusing to grant leave to appeal). The crux of the argument
as to why there was no reasonable cause of action was the failure of the
claimants to direct their challenge at one particular governmental measure.
The judicial willingness to dismiss the Tanudjaja claim at the very
threshold of Charter adjudication leaves claims to substantive equality
trapped between a rock and a hard place. On the one side of the trap  the
rock  governments and courts invoke the problem of complexity in order
to short circuit judicial scrutiny under the Charter. When claimants impugn
a withdrawal of, or failure to provide, a substantive equality measure,
governments point to the complex context of the measure to caution the
courts against any or much Charter scrutiny. However, on the other side of
the trap  the hard place  when claimants attempt to respond to the
problem of complexity by impugning not specific measures, but overall
outcomes, as in Tanudjaja, governments insist that the targeting of a
specific measure is a necessary pre-requisite of a valid Charter claim.128
For present purposes I am not going to engage the doctrinal debate
around whether the courts ought to accept the arguments that create the
rock or the hard place.129 Rather, my purpose is to highlight the
128
Governments also argue that it is necessary to base a claim on a factual record that
identifies specific individual claimants whose experience of rights violations can be adequately
documented. A failure to do this was part of the reason that an outcome-oriented systemic challenge
to inadequacy of legal aid in British Columbia was dismissed for want of a reasonable cause of
action a few years before Tanudjaja was launched, see Canadian Bar Assn. v. British Columbia,
[2006] B.C.J. No. 2015, 59 B.C.L.R. (4th) 38, 2006 BCSC 1342(B.C.S.C.) and [2008] B.C.J. No.
350, 2008 BCCA 92, 290 D.L.R. (4th) 617 (B.C.C.A.). The Tanudjaja claim is based, in part, on the
experiences of identified individuals/applicants and so avoids falling foul of this hurdle. Leaving this
difference aside, the Canadian Bar Association was caught by precisely the same trap in that the
government respondents argued that, on the one hand, the claim did not challenge any one specific
legislative measure affecting legal aid but also that, on the other hand, to the extent that the claim
might be challenging one specific measure, it was artificially isolating that measure from its
polycentric context. See: Canadian Bar Assn. v. British Columbia, Statement of Defence (British
Columbia), para. 8, online: <https://www.cba.org/CBA/Advocacy/pdf/statement_crown.pdf>.
129
I have elsewhere more fully analyzed the role of concerns about polycentricity/complexity in
judicial conceptions of the institutional competence of courts, along with other concerns, and the issue of
how to respond to them, see: Wiseman, supra, note 97.
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implications that maintaining the rock/hard-place trap has for the future
of constitutional law in relation to socio-economic inequality. If Charter
claims aimed at protecting or advancing substantive equality remain
trapped between the rock and the hard place that I have described, then
constitutional law will ultimately be unable to play anything but a
facilitative role in efforts to address socio-economic inequality and social
injustice. If government arguments on the problem of complexity prevail,
then the Charter, and the courts, will be shut out of the social and
political debate about socio-economic inequality and social injustice. As
mere facilitators, their only role will be to get the Charter, and
constitutional law more generally, out of the way of equality-enhancing
measures. Although it may be undesirable for constitutional law to aspire
to a leadership role on advancing substantive equality, it may also be
undesirable to relegate it to a merely facilitative role. Constitutional law
ought to at least be able to nudge governments either away from
retrenchments in substantive equality or towards advancements in
substantive equality  or to reinforce the efforts of others in society as
they attempt to nudge governments. Over the longer term, it may be
important for constitutional law to maintain a position in support of
protecting and advancing substantive equality.
In order to allow constitutional law to play a meaningful role in
protecting and advancing substantive equality, a choice must be made
about which side of the rock/hard-place trap to chip away. In my view,
since the problem of complexity should not be entirely dismissed or
ignored, it would be best to choose to soften the hard place by allowing
and developing or, at least, exploring, an alternative framework for
substantive equality claims, such as put forward in Tanudjaja.

V. CONCLUSION
Over the past three decades or more, constitutional law has
predominantly played a facilitating role in the improvement of social
justice and substantive equality in Canada. When Canadian governments
have taken action to ameliorate socio-economic inequality, Canadian
courts have generally cleared potential constitutional law roadblocks. At
the same time though, Canadian courts have only rarely erected any
barriers to governmental action that has exacerbated socio-economic
inequality. Although Canadian constitutional law, particularly under the
Charter, purports not to be constrained to a merely formal conception of
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equality, it has often refused invitations to protect and advance
substantive equality. This is not to deny that constitutional law has taken
some important steps towards substantive equality, nor to ignore that
some significant stepping stones for the future have been laid. But,
overall, progress has been, at best, restrained and cautious.
The restrained and cautious approach of constitutional law to
protecting and advancing substantive socio-economic equality stands in
contrast to the persistence of significant income deprivation and a steady
growth in income inequality. The detrimental impacts of poverty and
income inequality are far outstripping any beneficial impact of
constitutional law. This reality suggests that the constitutional conception
of equality is, to date, more majestic than substantive. While it may be
ill-advised, in a democracy, to seek judicial leadership on protecting and
advancing substantive equality, it ill-befits constitutional law in general,
and the Charter in particular, for courts to simply follow along as
governmental policy choices exacerbate and entrench significant
deprivation and inequality. Indeed, as it becomes increasingly recognized
that social trust and participation are eroded by income inequality, an
overly restrained and cautious judicial approach to substantive equality
ill-befits democracy itself. And yet Canadian courts are in danger of
being caught in a jurisprudential trap that threatens to curtail, if not undo,
the modest support for substantive equality they have shown so far. If
Charter adjudication is so trapped, not only would constitutional law and
democracy be vulnerable to further erosion, but so too would be the
opportunity that the Charter potentially provides to people living on lowincome and experiencing socio-economic inequality to take issue with
the governmental policy choices that frame their circumstances. In my
view, the best way to avoid this trap is to explore new approaches to
acknowledging and managing the social policy complexity that confronts
courts when adjudicating substantive equality-oriented claims. If it
proceeds that way, the future of constitutional law and social justice has
the potential to more meaningfully contribute to advancing substantive
over majestic equality.

